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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-COMPETENCY-UNCONTRADICTED
HISTORY OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A REQUIRE-
MENT FOR HEARING SUA SPONTE
In 1959, defendant was convicted of the murder of his common law
wife. During the trial, evidence was introduced showing that the de-
fendant had previously been committed to a mental institution. Upon re-
lease, he murdered his eighteen month old son and upon conviction served
almost four years in prison. It was also shown that unsuccessful efforts had
been made by his mother to recommit him. No request for a competency
hearing was made and defendant was subsequently convicted. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the defendant contended that he
was deprived of his right to a competency hearing. The conviction was
affirmed upon the court's finding that no hearing had been requested, and
that the evidence failed to raise a sufficient doubt to require the trial court
to conduct a hearing on its own motion. Subsequent habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in the federal courts resulted in defendant's discharge. The United
States Supreme Court held that the defendant was constitutionally entitled
to a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial sua sponte, due to
the uncontradicted evidence of defendant's history of irrational behavior.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
The Pate case is unique because it introduces an additional criterion for
courts to employ in ascertaining when it should order a competency hear-
ing sua sponte. Though courts have traditionally taken notice of a de-
fendant's competency by observing his demeanor at the trial, this decision
introduces the principle that the accused's history of mental incapacity is
to be used as a standard. In the instant case, the Court held that despite the
accused's apparent competent demeanor at the trial, his history of irra-
tional behavior was sufficient to require a competency hearing on the
court's own motion.
The instant case may be viewed as a modified application of a concept
deeply rooted in the history of criminal jurisprudence. As early as 1680, it
was recognized that if a man of
[S]ound memory commits a capital offense, and before his arraignment he
becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such
his phrenzy. ... And, if such person after his plea, and before his trial, become
of non sane memory, he shall not be tried; or, if after his trial, he becomes of
non same memory, he shall not receive judgment; or, if after judgment he
becomes of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of
sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.1
1 I HALE, PLEAs OF THE CROWN 34 (1680).
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Blackstone thereafter refined this concept in his observation that an in-
competent capital offender, though sane when he commits the crime,
should not be prosecuted, sentenced or punished.2
In Hadfield's Case,8 in 1800, the defendant had attempted to assassinate
George III by firing a pistol at him. Hadfield was indicted for high trea-
son. The evidence showed that the defendant, an old soldier, had sustained
a severe brain injury in battle and that he labored under the delusion that
he must sacrifice himself to keep the world from coming to an end. In the
King's Bench it was held that Hadfield should not be tried criminally due
to his incompetency, but that he should be detained in a proper place of
confinement.
At common law, the principle was recognized that an insane criminal
defendant could not be required to plead, and could not be placed on trial
while suffering from such disability.4 This rule was based on the rationale
that by an act of providence, the accused was unable to defend himself. 5
For example, there may be circumstances within his knowledge by which
he could be proven innocent, but due to his mental incapacity, he is un-
able to supply his personal knowledge to aid in his defense.6
The matter of mental competency has constitutional ramifications as
well. In United States v. Gundelfinger,7 the defendant was charged with
sending obscene, lewd and lascivious literature through the mail. The issue
was raised whether or not the defendant was mentally competent to stand
trial. The court's ruling upheld the almost universal principle that a person
charged with a crime cannot be tried while suffering from mental inca-
pacity, and, if such a person is placed on trial, it is a violation of his con-
stitutional right to due process of law.
2 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (4th ed. 1771).
8 27 STATE TRIALS 1281 (1800).
4 People v. Reeves, 412 II. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952). See Hyning, Mental Dis-
order in Illinois Criminal Law, 12 Cm. KENT L. REv. 19, 32 (1933); 59 MicH. L. REv.
1078 (1961), wherein the author stated: "It was the rule at common law that an
accused could not be required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime when
he was so mentally disordered that he could not meet the common law tests of com-
petency.'
5 People v. Maynard, 347 111. 422, 179 N.E. 833 (1932). See 39 TEXAs L. REv. 505,
507 (1961): "The policy which dictates that a finding of present insanity, i.e., insanity
at the time of the trial, operates to suspend prosecution rests on the notion that the
defendant must meet some minimal standard of competency before there can be a fair
trial."
6 See generally, 39 TExAs L. REv., supra note 5.
7 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Penn 1951); Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir.
1899); People v. McKinstray, 30 I1.2d 611, 198 N.E.2d 829 (1964); People v. Bender, 20
11.2d 45, 169 N.E.2d 328 (1960).
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When facts are brought to the attention of the trial court, which raise a
bona fide doubt as to the defendant's present mental competence, it is
obligatory upon the court to order a hearing to determine the defendant's
competency to stand trial.8 This procedure is a requisite, whether the
doubt arises before or during the trial, and whether it comes from sug-
gestion by counsel, or from the court's own observation. 9
Traditionally, the duty of raising the issue of capacity to stand trial was
imposed upon the defendant and his counsel. 10 The defendant waived his
right to a competency hearing if he failed to raise the issue of mental in-
competency and instead entered a plea of guilty, and the court pro-
nounced sentence." The trend of recent decisions, however, holds that a
mentally incompetent defendant is incapable of raising the issue of his in-
competency, and his failure to do so does not deprive him of his right to a
hearing on a motion to vacate and set aside sentence on the ground that he
was mentally incompetent during the time of trial.12
The hearing to determine the defendant's capacity to stand trial forms
no part of the criminal hearing.'8 It is a civil proceeding and evidence in-
troduced is not admissible in the criminal trial.14 At the competency
hearing, the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant is not at bar; the
sole issue is the accused's competency to stand trial.15 The test espoused to
resolve such issue is whether the accused has sufficient soundness of mind
to appreciate the nature of the charges brought and the proceedings
8 Hunt v. State, 284 Ala. 217, 27 So.2d 186 (1946); People v. De Simone, 28 Il1.2d
72, 190 N.E.2d 831 (1963); People v. Baker, 26 Ill. 2d 484, 488, 187 N.E.2d 227, 229
(1964), where the court stared: "[1Hf, before or during trial, facts are brought to the
attention of the court either from its own observations or by suggestion of counsel,
which raise a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's present sanity, it becomes the duty
of the court to impanel a jury to determine whether the accused is capable of under-
standing the charges against him and of cooperating with his counsel." See also State v.
Bladders, 141 Kan. 683, 42 P.2d 934 (1935).
9 People v. Shrake, 25 Ill.2d 141, 182 N.E.2d 754 (1962); State v. Collins, 162 Kan. 34,
174 P.2d 126 (1946).
10 United States v. Ragen, 167 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1948); People v. Haupris, 396 Ill.
208, 71 N.E.2d 68 (1947); People v. Reck, 392 11. 311, 64 N.E.2d 526 (1946); People
v. Hart, 333 I11. 169, 164 N.E. 156 (1928).
"1 McCane v. Alvis, 98 Ohio App. 506, 130 N.E.2d 372 (1954).
12 Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960); Simmons v. United States,
227 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Sturrup v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 279
(E.D.N.C. 1963).
13 People v. Cornelius, 392 Ill. 599, 65 N.E.2d 439 (1946); People v. Ross, 344 Ill. App.
407, 101 N.E.2d 112 (1951).
14 People v. Ross, supra note 13.
'IPeople v. Cornelius, supra note 13; Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327
(1911), wherein the court stated that the question presented is not the guilt of the
defendant, but whether his mental condition is such that he can conduct a rational de-
fense; the proceeding being wholly collateral to the trial in chief.
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thereon, and whether he is so mentally disabled as to render him unable to
consult with his attorney and conduct his defense in a rational and reason-
able manner.'0
The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to sus-
pend proceedings and conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's
competency in two specific situations. First, the court shall hold a com-
petency hearing if it has reason to believe the defendant is incompetent
"before trial or after judgement has been entered but before pronounce-
ment of sentence or after a death sentence has been imposed but before
execution of that sentence."'17 Second, if during the trial of the accused,
the court has reason to believe him incompetent, the court shall suspend
proceedings and conduct a competency hearing.' If the accused is ad-
judged incompetent, the criminal proceedings against him are suspended
until he is cured of his disability. In the event the accused is found compe-
tent, the criminal proceedings recommence at the point they were sus-
pended, without being prejudiced by the competency hearing. The Code
supplies the criteria to be applied in determining the competency of the
accused. An incompetent defendant is one who is,
[U]nable because of a physical or mental condition:
(a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or
(b) To assist in his defense; or
(c) After a death sentence has been imposed to understand the nature and
purpose of such sentence.19
The Code has retained intact the rule that where evidence, which raises
a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency to stand trial is
brought to the attention of the court by counsel, the court must order a
competency hearing. The rule has also remained unchanged, that if
through its own observation, a doubt is raised in the mind of the court as
to defendant's competency, the court must order a hearing sua sponte to
4etermine his competency. The court is compelled to order a hearing on
its own motion because under our system of jurisprudence, the courts are
charged with the proper administration of justice. Justice demands that
16 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, (1960); Moss v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 683 (10th
Cir. 1948); United States v. Bostic, 206 F. Supp. 855 (D.D.C. 1962); Higgins v. Mc-
Grath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951); United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724
(D. Ore. 1941); People v. Lewis, 2 IUl.2d 328, 118 N.E.2d 259 (1954); People v. Geary,
298 111. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921); State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938).
See 49 ILL. B.J. 216 (1958), where the test espoused as to the competency of the
accused at the time of the trial was whether his mental capacity was sufficient to
comprehend his own condition with reference to the proceedings against him and
sufficient to render him capable of rationally conducting his defense.
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-2(a) (1965).
18 IL.. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 104-2(b) (1965).
19 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-1 (1965).
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proceedings against an incompetent defendant be suspended until he can
defend himself.20
Traditionally, the court, by its own observation, took notice of the
accused's competency through his demeanor at the trial. The instant case
provides an important modification of this principle. The Supreme Court
held that, while the accused's "demeanor at the trial might be relevant to
the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense
with a hearing on that very issue."'21 The decision thus provides an addi-
tional criterion for the court to consider in determining whether to order
a competency hearing sua sponte. As a result of Pate v. Robinson, the
courts must now take into account the "uncontradicted testimony of the
accused's history of pronounced irrational behavior. '22 In so holding, the
Supreme Court served notice on the lower courts that it would continue
to vigorously protect the rights of the individual.
Kenneth Siegan
2oPeople v. Anderson, 31 Ill.2d 262, 201 N.E.2d 394 (1964); People v. Bender, supra
note 7; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957).
21 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966).
221d. at 385.
EVIDENCE-DEAD MAN'S ACT-APPLICABILITY TO
HEIRSHIP PROCEEDINGS
Decedent died in 1963 leaving a will that failed due to the prior death of
the sole legatee. Appellants filed a petition for leave to appear as heirs of
the decedent, claiming to be children of the decedent's purported half
brother. Appellees filed a petition stating that they were the sole heirs of
the decedent. At the proceeding to establish heirship the magistrate
allowed one of the appellees, an admitted heir, to testify as to heirship.
The court overruled appellant's objection that the admitted heir was dis-
qualified under section 2 of the Evidence Act' which prohibits an inter-
ested party from testifying on his own behalf when an adverse party sues
or defends as an heir. The magistrate ruled that the appellee was a com-
petent witness and on the basis of the disputed testimony held that appel-
lants were not heirs. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that section 2 of
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, 1 2 (1965): "No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding,
or person directly interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify therein
of his own motion, or in his own behalf, by virtue of the foregoing section, when any
adverse party sues or defends as the trustee or conservator of any habitual drunkard,
or person who is mentally ill or mentally deficient, or as the executor, administrator,
heir, legatee or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of any such heir,
legatee or devisee, unless when called as a witness by such adverse party so suing or
defending...."
